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1
1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 880277

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Priority 2

LYLE C. HENDRICKS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery,
a first degree felony, following a trial by jury in the Second
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah,
David E. Roth, judge, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction in

this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-2(2)(a) (Supp. 1988)
§ 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987) .
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendant's confession was properly

admitted at trial.
2.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish

defendant's guilt of aggravated robbery.
3.

Whether defendant received effective assistance of

4.

Whether the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial

counsel.

misconduct.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (1978):

Aggravated Robbery -

(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the
first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction on a charge of
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, following

a jury

trial before the Honorable Judge David E. Roth on January 20 and
21, 1988.

Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of not less

than five years and which may be for life at the Utah State
Prison, with an additional one-year enhancement for the use of a
firearm.

Notice of Appeal was filed in the Second District Court

on February 26, 1988.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
LeMoyne Murray, owner of Murray's Pharmacy, was working
with employee Evelyn Blackwell on the afternoon of December 8,
1987, at about 3:30 or 3:35, when a man wearing acid washed levis
and a white sweatshirt, later identified as defendant, came into
the pharmacy (T. 22, 44, 15, 37). He walked back into the
section of the pharmacy where only employees are allowed—an area
sectioned off from the remainder of the store by a gate (T. 15).
He pointed a large, uzi-type gun at Mr. Murray's head (T. 15) and

demanded all of his class II narcotics (T. 15, 37). Mr. Murray
advised defendant that he no longer carried class II narcotics
(T. 15). Defendant told Mr. Murray that he was, as Mr. Murray
put it, "serious about this F thing" (T. 17). Mr. Murray showed
defendant that the drawer where he used to keep his class II
narcotics was empty (T. 17), whereupon defendant turned around
and left the store as he made a parting comment to the effect
that he was not serious anyway (T. 17, 37). Despite this
comment, both Mr. Murray and Ms. Blackwell were very frightened
and believed that defendant was serious when he demanded the
class II drugs at gunpoint (T. 21, 40). As soon as defendant
left the pharmacy, Mr. Murray called the police, and Ms.
Blackwell went to the front of the store and saw the defendant
drive away in a blue Suzuki Samurai (T. 41). She relayed this
information to Mr. Murray, who immediately gave the vehicle
description along with a description of the suspect to the police
(T. 18, 42).
The police immediately acted on this information and
soon observed a vehicle that matched the description of the
suspect vehicle (T. 55, 68). Without provocation, the suspect
vehicle began to accelerate away from the police and tried to
evade them when they put on overhead lights and siren (T. 55, 56,
61).

The two occupants bailed out of the vehicle while it was

still moving (T. 56) and officers began foot pursuit (T. 57, 77,
90).

While officers were pursuing the suspects, another officer

secured the vehicle and observed in plain view on the back seat
an open case with a foam cut out in the shape of a small machine
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gun (T. 64). The officer then secured the case and observed a 9
millimeter Cobra handgun protruding from under the seat along
with two full clips of ammunition (T. 65-67).

The car was

registered to defendant (T. 69).
Officers pursued the suspects into a residential area,
where defendant was located hiding on a balcony of a building and
then surrendered to police (T. 79, 92). The second individual,
Sal Echeverria, was located in a care center hiding in a bathroom
vanity (T. 89).
Defendant was given his Miranda warning upon arrest by
Detective Miner (T. 97). He was taken to the police station for
a lineup (T. 79, 94). While awaiting the lineup, he stated he
wanted to talk with Detective Zimmerman (T. 81). Detective
Zimmerman, in the presence of Detective Miner, again advised
defendant of his Miranda warning (T. 83). Defendant said he
understood the rights and still wished to speak (T. 83). During
the conversation, defendant denied involvement in the incident
(T. 84). Defendant claimed that he had gone to a friend's house,
whose name he did not know, at 3 p.m. (T. 84). Sal Echeverria
later came to the house and borrowed defendant's Samurai and was
gone for about fifteen to twenty minutes (T. 84). When Sal
returned, defendant said that he and Sal went for a drive (T.
84).

When Sal saw the cops, he began to evade them (T. 84).

Defendant said he did not know why Sal was running, but he was
scared so he took off too (T. 84). When Detective Zimmerman was
informed during the interview that he had a phone call, he told
defendant his story would not fly and began to leave the room (T.

86).

Defendant then said that he had gone in the pharmacy, but

there was no robbery.

He then became upset and said, "that's it,

that's all I'm telling you" (T. 86). The questioning ceased, but
defendant added that he had gone into the pharmacy at about 2:30
or 2:45 to obtain some cold medicine (T. 87). Detective Miner
was not present when defendant stopped answering questions (T.
109).
At the lineup, defendant was positively identified by
both Mr. Murray and Ms. Blackwell (T. 22, 43, 95, 96). Defendant
was represented by private counsel, Mr. Stockdale, at the lineup
(T. 80). Subsequently, defendant was not able to retain private
counsel and was represented by a public defender (T. 105, 122,
123) .
Later the same night, defendant contacted Detective
Miner and asked him to come to talk with him (T. 125). Miner
asked what Stockdale had told him about talking to the police;
defendant said he had been told not to, but added words to the
effect of "forget that" (T. 125).
The next morning, while at his arraignment, defendant
again asked Detective Miner to talk with him (T. 98). In the
presence of a public defender, who defendant indicated was
representing him, he told Miner that he wished to talk with him
(T. 98). According to court records, defendant was represented
at the time by Scott Jensen (T. 115); defendant acknowledged that
he had an attorney during this time, although he could not
remember his name (T. 116). During the course of this
conversation, defendant admitted going into the
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pharmacy with a

gun (T. 101). He also admitted that he went into the pharmacy
with the intent of obtaining drugs (T. 101). Additionally, he
stated that he had been taking cocaine all day and that he needed
the drugs to stay high so he would follow through on a plan to
kill an individual with whom he had had a previous confrontation
(T. 101).
Defendant relied on his privilege against self
incrimination and did not testify or present evidence at trial
(T. 124). Following presentation of the evidence, there was a
discussion in chambers regarding the statement made to Detective
Miner on the morning of the arraignment (T. 115-17).

Mr. Laker,

defendant's trial counsel, was aware that the statements were in
the police reports and would likely be introduced at trial (T.
115), and he objected to their admission into evidence at the
time they were introduced (T. 99). The Court indicated that
based upon the evidence before him, the statements were
admissible.

Regardless, he gave Mr. Laker the opportunity to

present evidence, from Scott Jensen specifically, to show that
the statements were inadmissible (T. 116). The next day, Mr.
Laker informed the court that he had spoken with Scott Jensen and
that Jensen had interviewed and had contact with defendant prior
to the time defendant talked with Detective Miner (T. 122-23).
Although Jensen may not have been aware that defendant talked
with Detective Miner, Mr. Laker stated Jensen was present at the
time and represented him during the arraignment (T. 123). Mr.
Jensen agreed to come to court to make these representations to
the court, but in view of the voluntariness of the confession,
Mr. Laker chose not to have Jensen do so (T. 123).

Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of
guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery (R. 42). Defendant
was sentenced to a term of five years to life at the Utah State
Prison, with an additional year enhancement for the use of a
firearm (R. 49).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant was advised at the time of his arrest of his
Miranda rights by Detective Miner prior to being taken to the
police station for a lineup.

While awaiting the lineup

procedures, defendant indicated his desire to speak about the
case with Detective Zimmerman.

He was again advised of his

rights and waived them, and during the course of the interview,
he denied any involvement in the robbery.

His statement was

inconsistent and when he was pressed by Detective Zimmerman, he
refused to speak any further but then added an additional detail
about his previous activity.

The defendant was left alone by the

police at that point.
The next morning, while represented by an attorney who
was present with him at the arraignment, defendant initiated a
conversation with Detective Miner where he admitted to his
culpability in the crime.

Defendant was represented by attorney

Scott Jensen, according to court records.

He admitted that he

went into the store with a gun to get drugs.

Detective Miner did

not give the defendant a renewed warning during this
conversation.
The statement was voluntary, and therefore, admissible
at trial.

The court should look to several factors in deciding

the need for a renewed warning.

First, the time lapse between

the initial and subsequent interrogation; second, whether the
subsequent interrogation was with another officer; and third,
whether the subsequent interrogation was initiated by the suspect
or the police.

Looking to these factors, a renewed warning was

not required at the subsequent interview.
The facts of this case overwhelmingly point to
defendant's guilt.

The evidence supported the jury's conclusion

that the defendant committed aggravated robbery.

The evidence

was not so insubstantial or inconclusive that a reasonable person
could not have reached a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The defendant was provided effective assistance of
counsel.

Defendant has failed to show that another attorney in

his counsel's position would have pursued any different course of
action during trial.

Defendant has failed to meet his burden of

showing that his counsel rendered deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, or that he was prejudiced by his counsel's
alleged inefficiency.
The record is totally devoid of support for defendant's
contention that the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS INFORMED OF, AND WAIVED, HIS
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT PURSUANT TO MIRANDA,
AND HIS SUBSEQUENT CONFESSION WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
Defendant urges this Court to overturn his conviction
due to the admission of a statement made by him to a police
officer during a conversation initiated by defendant.

While

defendant was at the scene of his arrest, Detective Miner advised
him of his Miranda rights, defendant responded that he knew them
and did not do anything wrong (T. 97). A short time later, while
at the jail awaiting a lineup, defendant made statements to
Detective Zimmerman; he was told not to say anything until he was
advised of his Miranda rights; defendant responded, "I know my
Miranda rights" (T. 81-82).

Nevertheless, in the presence of

Detective Miner, Detective Zimmerman again advised defendant of
his Miranda rights.

He waived the rights, and specifically

stated that he understood the rights and wished to speak.
Defendant then told the detectives of his earlier activities of
the day, and denied committing the robbery.
Later that night, defendant initiated contact with
Detective Miner; when asked what his attorney had told him
regarding talking to the police, defendant said words to the
effect of "forget that" (T. 97, 125). The next morning,
defendant was arraigned (T. 98). During the arraignment, he was
represented by Scott Jensen (T. 98, 115). Detective Miner was
present at the jail, and defendant again initiated contact with
him (T. 97). While standing next to the doorway with his
-9-

attorney, defendant asked Detective Miner if he could talk with
him (T. 98). They went to one of the jail interview rooms;
Jensen was present initially, and went back and forth between
arraignments and the interview until it was time for defendant to
be arraigned (T. 98, 100). During the interview, defendant
confessed to the crime (T. 101).
The afternoon prior to his confession, defendant was
advised of his rights by two police officers, including the one
to whom he confessed, who was also present the second time
defendant was advised.

Defendant had specifically stated that he

knew his rights, that he understood them, and that he wished to
talk (T. 83). Defendant did not specifically claim at trial, nor
does he assert in his brief, that his statements were
involuntary.

He simply claims, citing United States v. Suggs,

755 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1985), that after defendant terminated
the earlier interview, he should have been re-Mirandized prior to
asking him questions about the case (AB 7-8). He claims the
second interview was "too remote in time and in fact a totally
distinct situation involving a separate officer" and that Miner
should have contacted defendant's attorney before the interview
( (AB 8).

Suggs does not support defendant's contention; the

eleventh circuit upheld the trial court's admission into evidence
of the defendant's confession.

The court noted that if the

incriminating statement was made in response to interrogation
after the defendant had invoked his right to remain silent, the
statement would not been inadmissible.
M

The court continued that

[v]oluntary incriminating statements, however, not made in

response to an officer's questioning are freely admissible.

Id.

at 1541 (citations omitted).
Defendant's contentions are without merit.

First, the

second interview, which defendant, not the officers, initiated,
was less than twenty-four hours after the first interview and
was, therefore, not remote in time.

Second, the interview was

not a totally separate situation; detective Miner was present
when defendant was advised by Detective Zimmerman of his Miranda
rights for the second time and was present for part of the
interview (T. 83). Finally, defendant's attorney was present
when defendant asked to talk to Detective Miner and even
accompanied them to the interview room (T. 98, 100). Under these
circumstances, the officer was not required to give defendant a
"fresh" Miranda warning prior to talking with defendant.
Although defendant does not specifically claim that his
confession was involuntary, he asserts that the Supreme Court has
repeatedly determined that the voluntariness of statements made
in a custodial interrogation is determined by the adequacy of the
Miranda warning (AB 6).

He claims that when defendant ended the

first interview, his action ended his knowing waiver of his
Miranda rights (AB 7).
The prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the confession was voluntary.
P.2d 439 (Utah 1988).

State v. Bishop, 753

This Court has consistently held that in

deciding whether a confession is voluntary, it will look to the
"totality of the circumstances" and reverse only when the trial
court has abused its discretion.

See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d
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233 (Utah 1985); State v. Ricci, 655 P.2d 690, 692 (Utah 1982);
State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981); State v. Meinhart,
617 P.2d 355 (Utah 1980); State v. Kaae, 30 Utah 2d 73, 513 P.2d
435 (1973).

Evidence sufficient to result in finding that the

confession is involuntary must reveal "some physical or
psychological force or manipulation that is designed to induce
the accused to talk when he would not otherwise have done so."
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d at 237. Thus, the confession must be
the product of duress or coercion before the conviction will be
reversed.
In the instant case, the evidence demonstrated by at
least a preponderance of the evidence that* the confession was not
the product of any type of manipulation by the police, and that
the confession was voluntary.

The conversation was initiated by

defendant (T. 97). Defendant's sole contention is that he should
have been given a fresh Miranda warning prior to this
conversation, since he had invoked his right to silence in an
interrogation with Detective Zimmerman the previous evening.
Defendant was advised of, understood and waived his rights during
the interview (T. 82-83).

While it is not out of the realm of

possibility, it seems highly unlikely that he forgot these rights
overnight.
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the United
States Supreme Court held that once an accused invokes his right
to remain silent, the accused cannot be subjected to "further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further

communication/ exchange, or conversations with the police."
at 484-85 (emphasis added).

In Edwards, the defendant was

arrested and taken to the station.
waived, his Miranda rights.

Id.

He was advised of, and

He spoke to the police, but then

specifically stated he wanted an attorney; the questioning then
ceased.

The next morning, two colleagues of the initial officer

went to the jail to speak with Edwards.

He said he did not want

to speak with anyone but was told "he had" to. ^Id. at 479. He
was again advised of Miranda and said he would talk after listing
to his accomplice's taped statement.

After listening to the

tape, he gave a statement in which he implicated himself.

The

Court stated that an accused must give a voluntary and knowing
relinquishment of the right to counsel.

Ici. at 482 , citing

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).

However, once an accused

is informed of his rights, the accused may waive them.
484.

1A. at

The Court reasoned that it would be "inconsistent with

Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance,
to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted
his right to counsel."

:id. at 485 (emphasis added).

However,

the Court noted that an accused is not powerless to countermand
his election of the right to remain silent.

If an accused

initiates the conversation, the fifth and fourteenth amendments
do not preclude the police from using the voluntary statements at
trial,

id.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the

issue of when a police officer must re-Mirandize an accused;
however, it is clear from Edwards that even when an accused
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invokes his right to remain silent, he is then free to change his
mind, and if he initiates the conversation, the police may speak
with him and use any incriminating statements at trial.
This Court addressed the issue

in State v. Martinez,

595 P.2d 897 (Utah 1979), and held that once an accused had been
advised of his Miranda rights at the time of the initial stop of
his vehicle, it was not necessary to readvise the accused of his
rights about one-half hour later after he had been placed in
custody.

This Court noted that it is "important to have in mind

the origin and purpose of those rights," which was to safeguard
against oppressive methods and abuses that led to unjust
convictions.

Jd. at 899.

However, it is important not to

distort the protections and impose unreasonable requirements upon
police officers.

Id.. The Court found that it would serve no

purpose to require readvisement of rights one-half hour later.
In considering the need to repeat Miranda warnings at
subsequent interrogations, courts have looked to various factors.
The most significant factor is whether the second interrogation
was initiated by the police or by the defendant.

In State v.

Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985), the defendant was charged
with murder.

After failing a polygraph test, police continued to

ask defendant to tell his side of the story, even though
defendant repeatedly insisted he would not make a statement until
he was represented by counsel.

Nine hours later, the defendant

initiated a conversation with police officers and confessed to
The focus was, however, on whether an accused was entitled to a
repeated warning once placed in actual custody, rather than the
lapse of time between a warning and subsequent interrogation.

the killing.

While disapproving of the continued requests by

police to tell his side of the story, the court allowed the
confession:
We find it significant that the defendant was
left alone between 6:00 p.m. and 3:00 a.m.,
when Officer Thompson was summoned at the
defendant's request . . . . Under the
circumstances here, the trial judge could
well have found that defendant initiated the
subsequent communications with Thompson and
that his statements amounted to a valid
waiver of his fundamental right to counsel
and were therefore admissible at trial.
Id. at 1217-18.
In the instant case, the police were even more
circumspect in their dealings with defendant.

When defendant

stated he did not wish to continue the conversation in the
previous interrogation, the questioning ceased (T. 86-87).

His

subsequent contact with police was on his own initiative (T. 98).
An additional factor to be considered is the amount of
time that has lapsed between the initial interrogation and
subsequent interrogations.

In State v. Lenon, 570 P.2d 901

(Mont. 1977), the defendant was arrested for possession of
dangerous drugs and taken to jail.
rights at about 3 a.m.

He was advised of his Miranda

At 9 a.m. the same morning, without a

fresh warning being given, the defendant executed a statement in
response to police questions.

The Court stated that such a brief

time lapse between the verbal warning and the confession did not
create a duty to repeat the warnings.

The defendant had given

every indication that he understood the rights, and under the
"totality of the circumstances" the confession was voluntary and
there was no need to repeat the warning.
-15-

Ld. at 907.

In Hayes

v. State, 633 P.2d 751 (Okla. Crim. 1981), the court held that
after a defendant had been advised of and waived his Miranda
rights at an initial interrogation, it was not necessary for the
officers to readvise the defendant of his rights two days later
when he initiated a second statement.
Other courts have looked at time lapses from several
hours to seven days and found that there was no need to repeat
warnings.

Arizona v. Gilbreath, 107 Ariz. 318, 487 P.2d 385

(1972), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 921 (1972) (twelve hour interim);
United States v. Hopkins, 433 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971) (seven-day lapse); Maquire v. United
States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1099
(1969) (three day lapse).

In the instant case, defendant was

given a complete Miranda warning which he said he understood on
the evening he was arrested.,

The next morning, he initiated the

conversation with Detective Miner and gave a second statement.
This brief time lapse was not sufficient to require a renewed
warning.

The previous warning had not become stale in the

interim.
Additionally, courts should consider whether the
interrogations were by different officers.

In this case,

Detective Miner did not conduct the first interrogation, but he
was present for part of the interview, including when the
defendant was advised of his rights and acknowledged that he
understood them and wished to talk (T. 83). Detective Miner had
also advised defendant of his rights upon arrest (T. 97), In
this situation, Detective Miner knew that defendant understood
his rights and had knowingly and intelligently waived them.
-16-

Considering these factors together, it is apparent from
the totality of the circumstances of this case that the defendant
was fully aware of his rights and that he knowingly and
intelligently waived these rights when he voluntarily gave a
statement to Detective Miner.

The trial court did not abuse its

discretion by admitting this statement into evidence and the
introduction of the confession was not error.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT DEFENDANT'S GUILT
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to
convict him of the charge of aggravated robbery.

This Court

stated in State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that when a
defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction, an appellate court should limit the scope of its
review.
"We review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the evidence,
so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted." State v. Petree, Utah, 659
P.2d 443, 444 (1983); accord State v.
McCardell, Utah, 652 P.2d 942, 945 (1982).
In reviewing the conviction,
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we do not substitute our judgment for that of
the jury "It is the exclusive function of
the jury to weigh the evidence and to
determine the credibility of the witnesses .
. . ." State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 229,
231 (1980); accord State v. Linden, Utah, 657
P.2d 1364, 1355 (1983). So long as there is
some evidence, including reasonable
inferences from which findings of all the
requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops.
Ld. at 345.
A person commits aggravated robbery when he uses, inter
alia, a firearm or facsimile of a firearm in the course of
committing a robbery.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1)(a) (1978).

Further, the act is considered in the course of an aggravated
robbery "if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of a robbery."

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(3) (1978).

The evidence in this case is sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully and intentionally
attempted to take drugs in the possession of Mr. Murray by means
of force or fear, and during the course of the attempt he used a
firearm.
Mr. Murray and Ms. Blackwell were working in Murray's
Pharmacy on the afternoon of December 8th when at about 3:30 p.m.
defendant went into the pharmacy with a large uzi-type machine
gun (T. 15, 37). He pointed the gun at Mr. Murray's head and
demanded that Mr. Murray give him class II narcotics (T. 15, 37).
Both Mr. Murray and Ms. Blackwell were in fear of the defendant
(T. 21, 40). Mr. Murray explained to defendant that he no longer
carried class II narcotics and showed him the empty drawer where

1 O

they used to be kept (T. 15). Defendant then turned around and
left the store (T. 17). Ms. Blackwell went to the front of the
store and saw defendant get into a blue Suzuki Samurai (T. 41).
Mr. Murray immediately called the police and gave them a
description of the defendant and the car (T. 18).
Acting upon this information, the police found the
suspect vehicle (T. 55, 60). Without provocation, the suspects
tried to evade police officers (T. 55-56, 61). Defendant and
another suspect jumped out of the car, which was registered to
defendant (T. 69), and police began foot pursuit (T. 57, 77, 90).
Defendant was located hiding on a balcony of a building and
surrendered to the police (T. 79, 92). The suspect vehicle was
registered to defendant (T. 69), and under the seat the officers
found a 9 millimeter Cobra handgun with two clips of ammunition
(T. 66-68).

The gun was identified as the gun used by defendant

in the aggravated robbery (T. 21, 38).
Defendant was positively identified by Mr. Murray and
Ms. Blackwell at a lineup (T. 22, 43), and at trial (T. 20, 44).
The morning after his arrest, defendant admitted to Detective
Miner that he went into the pharmacy with the intent of getting
class II drugs that would help him to stay high (T. 101).
The evidence overwhelmingly supports the jury's
conclusion that defendant committed aggravated robbery.

The

evidence was not so insubstantial or lacking that a reasonable
person could not have reached a guilty verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 412.
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POINT III
DEFENDANT HAD COMPETENT REPRESENTATION BY
ABLE COUNSEL AND WAS NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Defendant claims that he was not provided effective
assistance of counsel at all stages of trial.

Defendant makes

this claim in the brief filed by counsel as well as his pro se
supplemental brief.
Mr. Laker, defendant's trial counsel, did not file a
motion in limine asking for the suppression of defendant's
2
confession.

The trial court indicated that it would have been

logical for defense counsel to file such a motion if he were
concerned about the admissibility of the confession (T. 115).
Further, defense counsel chose not to cross examine four of the
witnesses (T. 44, 58, 87, 90).
The remainder of defendant's factual contentions, in
both his initial and supplemental briefs, are totally unsupported
by the record and, therefore, should not be considered by this
court.

Not only does defendant fail to cite to the record, a

cardinal rule of appellate procedure, if he made such an attempt
he would be wholly unable, as the record does not support his
3
contentions.
This Court should summarily affirm defendant's
2
Defense counsel made a timely and specific objection to the
admission of the evidence during the course of the testimony (T.
98-99).
Defendant's supplemental brief contains a number of inaccurate
factual claims and takes liberties with other aspects of the
record; the State will not unduly reinforce the allegations by
repeating them in detail here except to point out that
defendant's claims about, inter alia, Mr. Murray's alleged prior
criminal involvement, defense counsel's alleged failure to
contact Mr. Jensen and false statements regarding his contact,
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conviction where he fails to cite to the record in support of
nearly all of his factual allegations287 (Utah 1986).

State v. Olmos, 712 P.2d

Alternatively, if this Court declines to

summarily affirm the conviction, it should review only those
factual allegations that are based upon evidence contained in the
record.

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986).
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, reh'q

denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984), the Supreme Court adopted a twopart test to be used in examining claims based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel.

This Court has adopted this approach and

stated the following in State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah
1985):
In challenging a conviction on the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the
defendant's burden to show: (1) that his
counsel rendered a deficient performance in
some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the
outcome of the trial would probably have been
different but for counsel's error. Codianna
v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983).
See also State v. Julian, No. 870351, slip op. (Utah March 28,
1989); State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (Utah 1989).
Failure to meet either of these requirements will defeat a claim
based on ineffectiveness of counsel. Additionally, the claims
must be "sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that
counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable
professional judgment."
1986).

State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah

Further, this Court will not second-guess a trial

Cont. Detective Miner's alleged false testimony, and defense
counsel's alleged assistance to the prosecution are totally
unsupported by the record and must, therefore, be disregarded.
-21-

attorney's use of judgment as to trial tactics or strategy.
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah 1983); see also
Layton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Utah App. 1987).
In the instant case, the most substantive claim (and
one of two claims supported by the record) defendant makes
against counsel is his failure to file a pretrial motion to
suppress defendant's confession.

As discussed in Point I of this

brief, defendant's confession was properly admitted at trial;
therefore, in all likelihood, such a motion would have been
failed.

This Court has held that "failure of counsel to raise

motions or objections that would be futile if raised does not
constitute ineffective assistance.

State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d

56, 58 (Utah 1982) abandoned in part on other grounds in State v.
Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); ^ee also State v. Wight, 765 P.2d
12 (Utah App. 1988) .
The defendant's burden is to show that representation
falls below an objective standard of reasonableness.
405.

Frame at

He must prove that "specific, identified acts or omissions

fall outside of the wide range of professionally competent
assistance."

1^.

While the trial court suggested that it may

have been prudent to file a pretrial motion to suppress the
confession (the judge later said that such a motion likely would
have failed [T. 117], and counsel also admitted that such a
motion would have been futile [T. 123]), it was not requisite to
do so.

Given the circumstances surrounding defendant's

confession, defendant has failed to demonstrate that another
attorney in the same set of circumstances would have pursued a
different course of action.
-22-

Defendant also questions counsel's failure to crossexamine State witnesses.

The record shows, however, that counsel

cross-examined four out of the eight state witnesses (T. 24, 52,
70, 103). Defendant fails to point out what information would
have been brought out on cross-examination of the remaining
witnesses.

It is well settled that an appellate court "will not

second guess a trial attorney's legitimate use of judgment as to
trial tactics or strategy."

State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah

App. 1988), citing Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1110 (Utah
1983).

A decision on whether to cross-examine is very firmly in

the discretion of the trial attorney.

Further, in this case,

cross-examination of the four other witnesses would have produced
nothing favorable to defendant, and would likely have served to
simply reinforce their direct testimony.
This Court need not reach the performance of the
attorney in this case, however, since defendant has failed to
show that he was prejudiced by his attorney's performance.

In

Frame, 723 P.2d at 405, this Court stated:
We need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient if defendant fails
to satisfy his burden of showing that he
suffered unfair prejudice as a result of the
alleged deficiencies. As stated by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland; A
court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining
the prejudice suffered by a defendant as a
result of the alleged deficiencies. The
object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to
grade counsel's performance. If it is easier
to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which
we expect will often be so, that course
should be followed.
See also State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 12 (Utah, 1989).
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Defendant contends that the State would have failed to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he went into the
pharmacy with the intent to rob Mr. Murray of his class II drugs
if his confession had been suppressed.

Even absent the

confession, defendant has failed to show the result would have
been different.

To prevail, a defendant must:

show that but for the alleged deficiencies of
counsel there exists any reasonable
probability that the jury's verdict would
have been different. He [must show] that the
adversarial process of the trial was so
undermined that the jury could not have
produced a just result.
Frame, at 405. As detailed above, even absent the confession,
evidence of defendant's guilt was substantial.

A jury

considering the remainder of the evidence could have reasonably
found that defendant committed the crime of aggravated robbery.
POINT IV
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
Defendant's final contention, which is raised in his
supplemental brief, is that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct
because she used the allegedly false testimony of Detective Miner
and misled the jury during closing argument.

Defendant's claim

that Detective Miner's testimony was false is not supported by
the record; in fact, Detective Miner's testimony was totally
uncontradicted as well as consistent.

Further, all of the

prosecutor's remarks in opening statement and closing argument
were supported by the record.

Defendant's failure to support his

claim should result in summary affirmance.

See State v. Wareham,

No. 860312, slip op. (Utah, March 13, 1989); State v. Amicone,
689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984).

CONCLUSION
The defendant, Lyle C. Hendricks, was properly
convicted of aggravated robbery.

For the foregoing reasons, and

any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State of
Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's
conviction.
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